Discerning the Spirits of Modernity and Postmodernity by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Pembroke & Nikkel, David H.
 1 
   DISCERNING THE SPIRITS OF MODERNITY 
        AND POSTMODERNTY 
by David Nikkel 
This article originally appeared in Tradition & Discovery: the Polanyi Society Periodical, 2006-07, v. 33:1  
 I count myself among a large number of scholars of religion (and other 
disciplines) who believe that we live in the midst of a major shift in Western culture—
that we are moving from the modern age into a postmodern age.1  In the opening sections 
of this essay I will delineate some distinguishing characteristics of the postmodern versus 
the modern spirit.  I will proceed by describing respective controlling assumptions and 
concomitants of first modernity, then postmodernity.  One postmodern assumption is that 
every individual and culture has basic assumptions, models, images, pictures that control 
the way one views the world.  Such controlling assumptions function like eyeglasses—
one looks with or through them, but does not normally look at them.  (And indeed some 
assumptions are so basic or prereflective that, like one’s own eye, one cannot look at 
them at all.)2
 Postmodern sensibility would caution against any absolute postulating of the 
essence of an era, especially in contrast to another era.  So I offer my understanding of 
the modern versus postmodern spirit not as an absolute or monolithic schema that 
disallows countervailing tendencies or alternative schemas, but as a general description of 
some contrasting tendencies involved in this cultural shift.  Adding to this general caveat 
my judgment that the movement from modernity to postmodernity has been long and 
gradual, I expect astute readers will have no problem identifying exceptions to my 
distinctions. 
  Next I will discuss historical and logical relationships between the modern 
and postmodern spirits. 
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 In the final sections of the essay, I will consider the relationship of the 
postmodern spirit to theology, primarily through the use of selected and hopefully 
representative movements and figures.  In light of the judgment that the move to 
postmodernity has been a protracted one, I will look at some trends in theology, from 
Schleiermacher to the contemporary scene, in terms of their affinity with the postmodern 
spirit.  Finally, I will examine three types of self-descriptively postmodern theology and 
assess them in relation to the spirit or logic of postmodernity as I have construed it.  
While I intend this construal to be acceptable to all three camps—the radical or 
deconstructionist/poststructuralist, the conservative or “postliberal,” and the moderate, an 
important purpose of this essay is to take a stand for moderate postmodernism.  So I write 
as a critical and constructive theologian of the moderate postmodern strand, contending 
that it alone among the types consistently draws out the implications of the postmodern 
spirit—while the other two end up being more modern than postmodern in crucial 
respects.  This project thus counters the use of “postmodern” as a synonym for 
“deconstructionist” or “poststructuralist” by some scholars, both sympathetic and 
unsympathetic to radical postmodernism.  My attempt to define “postmodern” is thus an 
enactment of the postmodern insight that reality is (in part) defined, enacted by us. 
 
            
 
 I. The Modern Spirit 
 An original hallmark of modernity has been its stress on the individual and its 
great faith in individual critical reason.3  Religiously speaking, Martin Luther’s standing 
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alone before the Diet of Worms dramatically signaled the coming of modernity.  While 
the Protestant Reformation elevated the authority of Scripture, individual critical reason 
and conscience—hopefully guided by the Holy Spirit—received new freedom to interpret 
Scripture and make judgments.  Correspondingly, this development greatly diminished 
the collective authority of institutions and tradition. 
 Certain Renaissance paintings represent the artistic beginnings of modernity as 
they reveal a controlling assumption or “picture” of modernity (Poteat, 59).  In contrast to 
actual vision, everything in these paintings, including all elements of the foreground and 
background, appears crystal clear.  A basic assumption of modernity is that the individual 
can leave behind all limitations of one’s body and perceptual equipment, temporality, 
language, and culture and reach an absolutely privileged position where one can “see” 
everything (including oneself) with complete clarity.  Descartes, controlled by this 
picture, signaled the beginning of modern philosophy.  Finding that all of his knowledge 
failed according to such a criterion of absolute—and explicitable—certainty, Descartes 
finally felt he reached the privileged position in his reflexive and self-conscious 
subjectivity—“I think, therefore I am.”  In comparison with the Reformation, the ensuing 
Enlightenment of course radicalized the role of critical reason with respect to Scripture 
and tradition.4
 I will now consider some ramifications of this controlling picture of modernity, 
mostly confining my remarks to the realm of Western thought
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 1) Probably the most significant consequence of modernity’s picture of the 
absolutely lucid and self-possessed subject was its dualisms between subject and object, 
mind and matter, including the body.  If the individual human subject or mind is the 
:   
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absolutely privileged starting point, it becomes difficult or impossible to reach or have 
any meaningful connection with the object or the physical (especially by the criterion of 
absolute certainty).  The question becomes, how can mind impose meaning on inherently 
meaningless matter?  For the flip side of the absolute subject is the absolute object:  
critical, distancing reason tends to turn what is in its gaze into nothing but an object.  If, 
conversely, the simply material object and sense perception that supposedly mirrors the 
object serve as the absolutely privileged starting point, then it becomes difficult or 
impossible to reach or find any meaningful role for the human subject—which tends to be 
reduced to simply an aggregate of matter and energy.  As with Humpty Dumpty, no one 
could put subject and object back together again, given the controlling assumption of 
modernity.   
 In either its idealist or physicalist manifestations, modernity’s controlling picture 
leads to loss of meaning and, in the extreme, to personal and cultural insanity:  idealism 
by sundering us from our bodies and emotions and our embodiment in the world; 
physicalism by having no place for the sacredness of human and animal life.  While 
physicalism emphasizes the body as physical system, it is as discarnating as idealism, 
alienating us from our experiential, intentional bodies.  Idealism divorces purpose from 
the world; physicalism divorces the world from any purpose. 
 2) Having (assumedly) left behind the nitty-gritty of existence in time, modern 
thinkers have been wont to claim to see the essence of being, human nature, history, the 
Bible, or Christianity.  Such claims have often involved the positing of absolute 
categories, often paralleling the fundamental subject-object and mind-matter dualisms, 
often hierarchical.  Examples include the human world versus nature, inner versus outer, 
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reason versus emotion or sense perception, an enlightened age versus past benighted 
ages. 
 3) In principle, everything could come under the gaze of the absolute subject; 
everything should be assimilable to the individual’s critical knowledge.  What critical 
reason’s categories and logic could not assimilate tended to be ignored, dismissed, or 
destroyed.  Diverse images that come to mind include Thomas Jefferson’s version of the 
New Testament with all supernaturalistic passages deleted, the humanities attempting to 
establish their relevancy before the bar of science, and the unparalleled ideological 
violence (at least in scale) of the modern age. 
 4) The model of the absolutely privileged and neutral position assumes all objects 
of knowledge as already fully constituted apart from the individual’s coming to know.  
Truth is simply correspondence to a reality already “out there” (for those on the object 
side of the dualism) or already “in here” (for those favoring the subject side).6
 
 
    II. The Postmodern Spirit 
 The contrasting controlling picture of postmodernity is a person standing in the 
world, with always at least “one foot in” one’s body, temporality, society, culture, 
language, history, tradition, etc.  While humans do indeed have reflexive, critical, 
transcending capabilities (far greater than those of any other animals on earth), such 
capabilities are not absolute as modernity tended to assume.  One’s ability to take off the 
eyeglasses through which one looks at reality and to look at those eyeglasses is limited.  
One cannot get out of one’s own skin!  One implication of the postmodern controlling 
assumption is that a person always stands embodied, enmeshed, enculturated in meaning 
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and value.  Normally we do not need critical reason to establish or justify meaning a la 
Descartes and his successors.  Rather, critical reason can come into play when questions 
arise in our practice or when meanings break down.  
 Following are ramifications of postmodernity’s controlling assumption paralleling 
and contrasting with those of modernity: 
 1) Neither subject nor object constitutes the privileged starting point for 
postmodernity.  In terms of individual epistemology—granting an inalienable social 
component –someone knowing or perceiving something is the only starting point.  Any 
attempt to completely “get behind” the act of knowing, to reach the subject “in itself” 
(that is, in total distinction from any object known) and likewise to reach the object in 
itself (that is, in total distinctness from any subject knowing it), is rejected.  The 
postmodern spirit disowns this attempt not just because of its practical impossibility, but 
as misguided in principle:  there is no absolute or pure subject to abstract out of the world 
and society in which one is embodied.  It regards a person as a mindbodily continuum or 
whole.  “Mind,” as our awareness of and our attempt to make sense of things, and 
“body,” as that with which we relate to a natural and social world, are radically 
interrelated, and both come into play at some level in all our acts. 
 2) In similar fashion, postmodernity views related distinctions or polarities—such 
as inner versus outer, reflective versus prereflective, the human versus the natural world, 
linguistic versus prelinguistic—as continuous, interrelated, and relative to context (never 
absolutely distinguishable).  Besides eschewing dualisms, the postmodern spirit also runs 
counter to attempts to find the (necessary) essence of being, human nature, history, a 
religion, or a text.  In general, it distrusts any rigid or absolutistic scheme of classification 
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or categorization, on the grounds that such totalizing endeavors miss the richness, 
complexity, and contextuality of life, especially in its temporal and changing character 
and it its prereflective and tacit dimensions. 
 3) Compared to modernity’s overemphasis on the individual, postmodernity 
elevates the value of what transcends the individual.  Descriptively and prescriptively, the 
cruciality of the social dimensions of life, including the authority of the group and 
tradition, are (or should be) recognized. 
 For the postmodern spirit, what appears different from or other than one’s self, 
beliefs, or values should not ultimately be either assimilated or dismissed or reduced to a 
mere object.  Instead one should encounter—an encounter that partially defines oneself—
or engage in dialogue with the other, dialogue that appreciates and respects real 
differences (without entailing that one must ultimately equally accredit all the differing 
beliefs and values).  In postmodern logic no privileged or neutral position exists to which 
contrary views must summarily reconcile or else face elimination. 
 4) The postmodern spirit holds that our perceiving, knowing, and acting play a 
significant role in creating the world we experience.  On a very pre-reflective level, the 
truth of this contention becomes evident by imagining how different a lake looks to a bird 
flying over it or to a fish swimming in it than to a human being.  Each creature’s 
perspective brings what is there into definition—there is no fully determinate lake in itself 
nor any perspectiveless perspective on the lake.7  (A la Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle, our “measuring” or perceiving always has some effect on what we know—our 
knowing always leaves some trace!)  On a more reflective level, the vast array of 
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languages, cultures, worldviews, and religions across the globe and through the ages 
suggests humanity’s vital role in creating the worlds of meaning in which we dwell. 
 
      III. Discerning the Spirits 
 Some have characterized modernity as an era (increasingly) aware of the 
historical and cultural conditionedness of everything human, an era that diminished or 
vanquished absolutisms (e.g., Wall, Hopper).  Can we square that characterization with 
my claim that the picture of the absolutely privileged subject controlled modernity?  
While modernity’s critical reason slew the authoritarianisms and absolutisms of the past, 
it tended to do so with an assumption of its own absolutely privileged position!  The ideas 
and values of a growing number of individuals and cultures were exposed as historically 
relative, but modern thinkers tended less to sense the conditioned nature of their own 
critical reflection.  Marx and Hegel saw the relativity of all past periods of history, but 
nonetheless constructed an absolute master plan and final period of history.  Freud 
discovered the falsity of the model of total and explicit human consciousness and self-
control, yet he used his general awareness of the subconscious realm to devise 
absolutistic explanations of such things as women’s nature and the origin of religion. 
 Premodern absolutisms were uncritical and relatively prereflective.  The absolute 
authority and rightness of a tradition or a way of life were (again relatively speaking) 
simply assumed.  They represent a first-order naivete.  Modern absolutisms were/are 
reflective.  Supposedly neutral critical reason arrives at them.  They represent a second-
order naivete.  The naivete of critical reason is like a child who learns a new skill, such as 
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riding a bicycle, and is so giddy with the newfound power and possibilities that the 
limitations of this capability, like all things human, escape notice. 
 Realizing or assuming the unavoidably incarnate, finite, temporally and culturally 
conditioned nature of even one’s own thinking and valuing constitutes the crucial notion 
for admission into the postmodern age.  To say that the postmodern spirit can be 
“realized” or “assumed” allows its appropriation to be either relatively reflective or 
relatively prereflective.  Thus, the postmodern spirit overcomes or circumvents the 
second-order naivete of modernity. 
 Describing the relationships between the modern and postmodern spirits as I have 
above implies the inappropriateness of selecting one circumscribed period as the time 
Western culture left modernity and entered postmodernity.  By the nineteenth century 
intellectuals arose who were “postmodern” in certain aspects of their thought, including 
Soren Kierkegaard and William James.  As art had “announced” the beginnings of 
modernity, so also of postmodernity.  Impressionist renderings of the same scene at 
different times of day pointed to the inescapability of temporality and perspectivalism.  
Cezanne’s “out of focus” paintings suggested the necessary human component in 
bringing our world into definition (Poteat, 59).  We have been gradually entering the 
postmodern age and continue to do so.  The combination of the modern spirit slaying 
many authoritarianisms and a growing postmodern spirit has I judge been influential in 
an overall (if uneven) trend of the lessening of absolutism and a growing tolerance for 
diverse viewpoints in Western culture. 
 Parenthetically, I will mention an ambiguity pertaining to the postmodern truth of 
the embodied and conditioned nature of everything human.  On the one hand, this truth 
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contains a summons to self-criticism—it has a critical side.  It is sometimes both possible 
and appropriate to look at our individual and (sub)cultural eyeglasses and consider 
whether our lenses need a correction.  In this enterprise, those wearing different 
spectacles can help us to see assumptions we ourselves miss.  Also, the postmodern spirit 
calls us to guard against absolutizing our own perspective (or assuming we do not have 
one, which is tantamount to absolutism).  On the other hand, the inescapability of our 
embodiment and enculturation has an acritical or precritical side:  it is often 
inappropriate or impossible to look at our eyeglasses.  Michael Polanyi noted the acritical 
nature of all tacit acts of knowing (PK, 264). We can only devote a limited portion of 
time to the reflective enterprise of making explicit the normally tacit or prereflective—the 
rest of the time we must live.  And any such reflective attempts can only partly succeed, 
for critical reflection entails some temporal and perspectival distancing and separation. 
Finally, as indicated earlier, some assumptions are so basic that one cannot get behind 
them—they are more like one’s eye than like eyeglasses.8
 
   
   IV. The Postmodern Spirit and Modern Theologies 
 If postmodern sensibilities already emerged in the nineteenth century, they 
manifested themselves more strongly in Protestant theology than in most other areas of 
Western thought.  The modern spirit had unceremoniously dethroned theology as “queen 
of the sciences.”  Theology’s past pronouncements on scientific and other “secular” 
matters were clearly recognized as historically limited.  While theology’s competence or 
worth was under challenge with respect to more narrowly “religious” spheres, the cultural 
conditionedness of its religious formulations had not been as clearly established.  
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Friedrich Schleiermacher, anticipating the further reach of critical reason, made a rather 
remarkable and rather postmodern acknowledgment:  all of our characterizations of “the 
Absolute” are linguistically, culturally, and historically conditioned.  With some 
justification this “father of modern theology” might also be called the “father of 
postmodern theology.” 
 However, Schleiermacher could not let go of one area of absolute privilege, one 
absolute human connection with the divine:  the allegedly universal human “feeling of 
absolute dependence.”  (Note that the issue here is not the absoluteness of the divine, but 
the absoluteness of the claimed human connection.)  Granted attempts to express this 
feeling are always conditioned.  Granted, too, this feeling manifests itself only in and 
through the particular contingencies of each moment of experience.  Nevertheless, as a 
necessary component of every human experience rather that just a potentiality that some 
people realize some of the time, this feeling heralds its unconditioned and absolute 
character.  Moreover, that the particularities of this moment of experience versus that one 
finally do not make any difference—we have the basic sense of our absolute dependence 
regardless, in that sense this feeling remains unconditioned and pure in relation to any 
linguistic and historical particularities. 
 Most nineteenth and twentieth century theology followed Schleiermacher in 
clinging to one absolutely privileged divine connection.  For Tillich, it was the “mystical 
a priori”; for Whiteheadian process theology, awareness of the “initial aim” for each 
occasion; for neo-Thomism, implicit awareness and love for God; for existentialist 
theology, the courage to live authentically despite existential anxiety.  Note the 
prereflective nature of all these connections.  Modern theology had abandoned the 
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attempt at an absolute reflective knowledge of God.  But there remained the attempt to 
get underneath all cultural conditions through the prereflective. 
 Karl Barth, of course, denied any absolute or other connection coming from the 
human side.  Instead, the absolute connection comes from God’s intentional revelation in 
Jesus Christ.  As with Schleiermacher, human attempts to express this connection are 
relative (and Barth would add prone to idolatry).  But this human connection (albeit 
provided by God) receives absolute privilege. 
  I will now give general consideration to some movements in twentieth century 
thought which, though in some aspects very much imbued with the modern spirit, 
evidence important postmodern elements and implications.  Existentialist philosophy and 
theology in good postmodern fashion attacked modern and earlier attempts to abstract out 
and reify an atemporal human essence.  Existentialism also found earlier categorizations 
of reality too abstract and out of touch with the temporal and historical character of 
existence.  Much of existentialism, though, turned only outward in postmodern critique, 
not recognizing the historical limitedness and tendencies to absolutism of its own 
definitions of human nature and categorizations of reality.  For example, human beings in 
many contexts do not feel “thrown” into the world, but rather feel quite at home in it.  On 
a related note, our normal embodiment and enculturation in some meaning belies the 
notion that one could or should always explicitly decide to take on authentic meaning.  
(My faulting of this aspect of existentialism does not deny the fiduciary and interpretative 
elements of personal commitment in all knowing and valuing.)  In different ways, 
therefore, existentialism tended to shortchange both the self-critical and the precritical 
 13 
aspects of the postmodern spirit.  In one aspect most of existentialism remained under the 
sway of the modern spirit:  its pronounced individualism. 
 In contrast to existentialism, process philosophy and theology is postmodern in its 
focus on, and consistently positive evaluation of, the social nature and inter-
connectedness of reality.  Its emphasis on the temporality of all existence (which it shares 
with existentialism) and its denial of anything concrete about the self that is unchanging 
through time also resonate with the postmodern.  On the “down side,” its Whiteheadian 
metaphysical system seems firmly entrenched in the rationalist or idealist branch of 
modernity, arising out of a desire to please the (absolute) thinking subject with its all-
encompassing neatness.  Idealism animates its theory that “occasions of experience” 
comprise all reality, with matter in effect only apparent, as our abstracting from 
numerous low-grade (subatomic) experiences.  Idealism also imbues its theory of 
causation, in which all causation is a matter of experience, prehension, or sympathetic 
feeling.  To be fair, Whitehead does write of prehension in “the mode of causal 
efficacy”—we cannot help but to take account of what enters into our experience from 
the past.  Yet the metaphorical reliance on experience and on our taking in or grasping 
what affects us does not adequately account for materiality and exteriority, that is, causal 
efficacy that happens quite apart from any type of awareness or desire.9
 Even as modern theologians subscribed to the notion that their work was relative 
to their era, they generally did not notice its relativity to their identity as Western 
European and North American middle and upper class white males—they typically 
assumed they spoke for the whole of culture of their era.  As suggested earlier, 
postmodernity’s recognition of the difficulty of looking at the embodied, historical, and 
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subcultural perspective with which we view reality entails that often those from another 
perspective can look at our “eyeglasses” better than we can.  Liberation theology has 
certainly performed this service for mainline theology, showing how it has traditionally 
ignored or subsumed the otherness of persons of color, women, gays, lesbians, or the 
underclass and ignored or complied with their oppression.  Theology should value the 
other voices of homosexuals, women, blacks and the Third World to fulfill the 
postmodern spirit’s call to mutually engage the other. 
 
V. The Postmodern Spirit and Postmodern Theologies 
 Theologies consciously or self-descriptively postmodern have tended to fall into 
radical, moderate, and conservative camps over the past generation.  I now take up the 
(perhaps presumptuous) task of evaluating the contributions and prospects of those three 
types in light of the postmodern spirit as I have construed it—a postmodern scorecard, if 
you will.10
A. The Radicals 
  The thinkers who inform this typology are mostly North Americans in the 
Christian tradition (though the radicals would generally characterize themselves as 
influenced by, rather than part of, that tradition). 
 The postmodern theology that has caused the biggest splash, or the most waves, is 
the radical branch—deconstruction and other forms of poststructuralism.11  As a tool, it 
performs a valuable postmodern function in critiquing or “deconstructing”—exposing the 
assumptions and contradictions attending—the absolute and self-contained subject, 
absolute text, or absolutely privileged place in or beyond time.  As an a/ontology, 
poststructuralism is more problematic. 
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 This type of theology has been labeled “severe” or “negative” (Beardslee) or 
“eliminative” postmodernism because it purportedly eliminates concepts of God, self, 
history, and truth (Griffin).  The late Jacques Derrida is the premier philosophical 
influence behind this branch.  Representatives of this type of theology in the Protestant 
tradition were Mark C. Taylor and the late Charles Winquist; D.G. Leahy and John 
Caputo offer versions in the Catholic tradition (though in Leahy’s case more rooted in 
American pragmatism than in French postructuralism).  Though Taylor has since moved 
beyond his deconstructive phase, I judge that he most consistently developed the 
implications of Derrida’s philosophy for theology (especially before Derrida himself 
began to write about religion).  Therefore, I will be in conversation with him more than 
any other poststructuralist theologian. 
 Poststructuralism arises from a problem or “crisis of representation” growing out 
of modernity’s controlling picture—which assumed that we could transcend to reality “in 
itself,” a reality which our perceptions or words merely represent or to which they merely 
correspond, but in no way constitute.  The postmodern spirit, of course, senses that 
interest, desire, perception, interpretation, commitment, personal and communal history 
influence every experience.  Deconstruction reacts radically against modernity’s picture 
of transcendence and interprets postmodern insight to entail the total immanence of a 
person in one’s experiences:  We are trapped in our perceptions, our words, our 
interpretations, our constructions of reality—and there is nothing else (except perhaps the 
“nothingness” of utterly unpresentable differance).  Because of its reliance on linguistic 
metaphors, some have falsely accused deconstruction of denying non-linguistic elements 
of experience.12   What deconstructionists have maintained is the heavy influence of 
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language on most human experience (a position which other postmodernists would 
accept).  The key point here, though, is that no reality exists beyond our constitution of 
experience through language, perception, etc. 
 As with the modern and general postmodern spirits, art heralded deconstructive 
postmodernism, through much so-called “modernist” visual art and literature.  While 
William Beardslee may be correct in his generalization that aesthetic modernism did not, 
unlike deconstruction, abandon the quest for “a vision of the whole” (64, 149), I believe 
that the related observations of Stephen Moore and Karl Raschke are more to the point:  
Modernism did tend to downplay or abandon the attempt at representation or realism. 
 To be totally immanent in one’s representations is, in Derrida’s words, to plunge 
into “the horizontality of a pure surface” (1978:298).  For deconstructionists everything is 
surface, appearance, horizontality.  Not only do they deny absolute transcendence, but 
even relative height or depth.  This conflicts with Polanyi’s insight that knowing involves 
levels where tacit components contribute to wider, deeper, or higher focal contexts of 
meaning.  Critical reason or reflective distance takes a penultimate role in deconstructing 
particular contexts of meaning, but from an ultimate perspective (although 
deconstruction’s “a/theistic” premises disallow such a perspective) human beings are 
trapped in the largest context of meaning, a (predetermined?) humanly undecidable, 
flowing whole.13
 In keeping with the postmodern spirit, deconstruction emphasizes the relativity of 
meaning to context, the connectedness of the elements within a context, and the openness 
of a context to further and future interconnections.  This openness implies the 
  Everything is as it ought to be, leaving no room for sin or guilt (Taylor, 
1984:121, 151-58, 166-69).  
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inexhaustibility of reality.  Ironically, though, by placing everything on the same level of 
“appearance,” deconstruction instead offers a one-dimensional, flat, exhausted reality, 
lacking any sense of mystery.  Similarly, deconstruction undermines its valuing of 
otherness and difference by reducing all alterity to distances between points on the same 
plane—or as components of an enclosed, fragmented self.  This is one of the ironies of 
radical postmodernism its advocates have overlooked. 
 In the first place then, deconstruction holds that we are immanent and incarnated, 
totally inscribed in our bodies, culture, contexts of meaning.  Forgoing explanation of 
how we can transcend our interpretations enough to come to such a second-order 
conclusion, deconstruction’s next move is this:  since only interpretation or appearance  
exists, and given diverse, competing, and even apparently contradictory interpretations, 
one cannot seriously commit to any one interpretation.  Indeed, the microcosm of the self 
and its meanings is so fragmented that it mirrors the inconsistencies and incoherencies of 
the macrocosm.  Hence deconstruction’s sharp relativistic turn to irony or playfulness.  
Herein lies the supreme internal irony of radical postmodernism: the human being is 
regarded as totally embodied, immanent, committed, interested and at the same time 
called to be totally discarnate and disinterested.  If per impossible, one could fully take to 
heart deconstruction’s anthropology, schizophrenia would result.  Deconstruction’s 
freedom from commitment to particular values or worldview can never work in practice; 
deconstructionists like all creatures are standing somewhere.  (One commitment driving 
many radical postmodernists is opposition to totalizing ideologies that pretend to speak 
for the interests of all.) 
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 In a radical appropriation of the postmodern rejection of modernity’s search for 
absolute truth, Taylor offers wandering or “erring” as the primary metaphor for the 
human quest for meaning (esp. 1984:13, 149-58,179).  This accords with 
deconstruction’s belief that we can only reach the “sign” but never the destination.  Given 
the postmodern insight that we humans can never possess absolute presence or truth, 
deconstruction’s claim that each moment of experience involves the interplay of the 
presence and absence of meaning is correct.  From my Christian and my personal 
perspective, though, even granting these two equal billing in a polar relationship errs: the 
presence of meaning is more basic and stronger in normal human and animal 
experience.14  However, deconstruction goes further and gives pride of place to the pole 
of absence.  Its vocabulary and metaphors—such as erring, trace, shiftiness, 
undecidability, appearance(s) (and disappearance), marginality, darkness—suggest the 
insecure, unsettled, insubstantial, abysmal, and deconstructing nature of all meaning.  
Given the postmodern recognition of the impossibility of absolute self-presence, truth, 
and value, one might note that the cup of meaning is either relatively empty or relatively 
full.  Why does deconstruction opt for (relative) emptiness?  Perhaps pessimistic or 
skeptical personalities of its proponents play a part in deconstruction’s temperament.  
Undoubtedly, deconstruction’s emphasis on absence is partly rhetorical, an effort to 
counter-balance modernity’s (and the Western Greek-rooted philosophical-theological 
tradition’s) emphasis on absolute self-possession and truth.  But the decisive factor, as I 
have implied, now claim, and later will argue is the hidden yet controlling spirit of 
modernity and its haunting standard of absolute truth. 
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 With its emphasis on the absence of meaning, deconstruction takes its standing 
nowhere in ironic relativism to at least the brink of nihilism.  Having radically 
undermined all particular meanings, deconstruction can avoid the standing nowhere of 
nihilism only by trying to stand everywhere—by unqualifiedly affirming the 
interconnected totality of all that has or will transpire (Taylor, 1984:151-58, 166-69, 
182)—which is tantamount to standing nowhere relative to competing and contrasting 
possibilities, interpretations, and choices for individuals and societies.  Practically 
speaking, such a universal attachment to every particular is no more possible than the 
ironic detachment that constitutes the flip side of the same coin. 
 Deconstruction’s primary images for humanity and divinity cohere:  Even as the 
person is wholly immanent in one’s body and experiences, so divinity is wholly 
immanent with respect to the world.  Taylor writes of “the ever-never-changing-same 
[that] is the eternally recurring play of the divine milieu in which all things [emphasis 
his] arise and pass away.” (1984:112-20, 183).  Leahy also expresses the radical 
postmodernist vision:  “As never before the divine flows absolutely.  In this flow every 
notion of self is completely dissolved.” (1989:786).  In this conception of divinity, more 
radical than most historical forms of pantheism, no place remains for transcendence, 
personality, or purposive agency ontologically prior to the world (Taylor, 1984:118).  
Deconstruction takes “the death of God”—meaning the denial of any divine 
transcendence or selfhood—to be concomitant with the absence of any absolute human 
meaning.  Here deconstruction “errs” in a sense different than Taylor’s, in assuming that 
the contextual relativity of all human existence and meaning contravenes the existence of 
an Absolute Reality.15 The absence of any absolute human connection to the Absolute 
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does follow from a consistent upholding of the contextuality of all human meaning; but 
the acknowledgement of human contextuality does not at all settle whether the Absolute 
exists and can be known—relatively, of course.  Without denying deconstruction’s claim 
that the traditional understanding of God reinforced modernity’s picture of the absolute 
human subject, one can regard God as having a perfect knowledge and self-possession 
impossible for human beings (without entailing impassibility or immutability). 
 The great historical irony of deconstruction, which often denigrates “seriousness,” 
is that it has taken modernity’s controlling picture far too seriously.  Its extreme reaction 
against that picture of neutral and absolute truth—its affirmation of total immanence with 
its implications of relativism—forms the mirror image or the underside of the coin of 
modernity.  Radical postmodernism’s pessimism regarding meaning is quite appropriate 
relative to modernity’s standard of absolute presence and meaning that must be critically 
established, but quite inappropriate in light of postmodernity’s assumption of our 
inalienable embodiment and enculturation in some meaning.  An absolutistic reflective 
move—the positing of total immanence in divergent meanings—permits the reversal of 
postmodern optimism about our embodiment in meaning.  In spite of this pessimism, 
Peter Hodgson discerns an irony stemming from the obsession with absolute presence:  
deconstruction ends with a “total ‘having’ of divinity, and an undialectical immediacy,” 
with God as “totally incarnate in worldly inscription.” (37). While on one level the 
radicals strenuously denounce modernity’s quest for the place of absolute privilege, on a 
deeper (or perhaps better, more shallow) level—in the human possession of the highest 
possible meaning of an experience, the “surface” meaning, which is also the possession 
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of totally immanent divinity, and in the unqualified affirmation of the totality of 
experiences—the absolutistic spirit of modernity reigns. 
 To be fair to Derrida and his legacy, we must finally consider his later writings 
that explicitly deal with religion.  In particular, some writings develop a concept of 
messianism—endorsed and expounded upon by John Caputo—but a messianism 
“without content and without identifiable messiah” (Derrida, 1994:28).  While Derrida 
grants that this messianic concept perforce comes from the particularities of tradition(s), 
it is intentionally a formal concept, a wholly other that challenges in the name of justice 
the privileged claims of any historical social structure or meaning.  These latter works 
reveal both the ethical intent of radical postmodernism to undermine absolutistic regimes 
and its insufficient ontological base on which to do so.  Here Derrida comes to sense the 
absolutistic dangers of immanentism (as Taylor explicitly did [1991]).  But in doing so he 
posits a third companion on the transcendent side of the binary, to go with ironic 
detachment and unpresentable differance.  Just as with the other two, we lack any 
direction for deciding on the justness of concrete structures and meanings. 
 Descartes in his exercise in radical doubt at the philosophic beginning of 
modernity failed to recognize his inevitable standing in the world and in meaning.  Even 
as those controlled by the modern picture believe (falsely) that they stand nowhere in the 
world, so radical postmodernism, in its refusal to go beyond either a version of 
transcendental relativism or an unqualified affirmation of the whole, refuses to (claim a) 
stand in the world.  Taylor wrote, “Though always enacted over a bottomless abyss, 
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 festive play is never grave” (1984:164).  If my preceding analysis is correct, rather than 
dancing over the abyss of meaning, radical postmodernism is mourning at the coffin of 
modernity. 
     B. The Conservatives 
 Both Protestant and Catholic postliberal theologians emphasize the importance of 
enculturation in a tradition or worldview.  The Protestants regard secularists as ensconced 
in a competing tradition or worldview, while the Catholics tend to view them as tradition-
less, homeless, and needing to return to (the authority of) the Church.  Protestant 
postliberals include George Lindbeck, Stanley Hauerwas, and the late John Howard 
Yoder, with John Milbank and others adding a “Radical Orthodox” twist.  The former 
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, former Lutheran Richard John 
Neuhaus, and George William Rutler advocate Catholic postliberalism.  The Protestant 
postliberals engage in sophisticated postmodern discourse while the Catholics’ 
postmodernism largely confines itself to critique of modernity for its individualism, 
materialism, and utilitarianism. 
 My following remarks on postliberal anthropology apply more directly to the 
Protestants who have explicitly engaged in this postmodern argumentation.  The 
conservative postmoderns join the radicals in emphasizing human immanence in our 
experiences and viewpoints (though implicitly or explicitly parting company on whether 
a reality exists beyond our interpretations, especially in regard to ultimate reality). 
Noting both the deep rooting of persons in differing cultural-linguistic frameworks and 
the absence of a privileged position from which to adjudicate such differences, these 
thinkers have concluded that genuine understanding between basic perspectives is 
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unlikely or impossible.  Different worldviews must either contradict each other or—
drawing (or misdrawing, I believe) on Wittgenstein’s concept of different “language 
games” for different contexts—bypass each other.  Even apparent similarities and 
commonalities between Christianity and other cultural-linguistic frameworks allegedly 
prove discordant when viewed within their differing contexts.  In terms of the basic 
assumption or picture of postmodernity, such thinkers do not see human beings as getting 
even one foot out of one’s society, culture, history, or tradition.  The critical side of the 
postmodern spirit is downplayed or absent.  Such a conclusion also violates the 
postmodern spirit’s respect for otherness:  The other poses either a threat or an 
irrelevancy.16
 Such tribalistic thinking allows postliberal theologians to believe that the Bible or 
Christianity is its own world (view) in need of no authentication or corroboration by 
critical reason or any non-Christian perspective.  The posture of this conservative wing of 
postmodernity is defensive; the concern is to save Christianity from further critical 
attacks by modernity.  Postmodern logic implies that Christianity or any worldview 
carries (and to some extent creates) its own self-authenticating context of meaning.  
However, it does not imply denying or downplaying the importance of corroboration and 
questioning by critical reason and by alternative perspectives.  As Adam and Eve could 
not return to the garden of innocence, so as we leave modernity’s second-order naivete 
about critical reason, we cannot return to the uncritical first order naivete of premodern 
orthodoxy.  We will be the poorer in added misunderstanding and conflict and foregone 
cooperation if each worldview and religion naively assumes its absoluteness—absolute 
here in the sense of an entity unto itself, unrelated to others.  In addition, this notion of a 
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more or less unbridgeable gap between differing worldviews has very negative 
implications for a traditional Christian concern—evangelism. 
 Postliberals do offer a positive contribution to contemporary theology by 
challenging Christians to be genuinely immanent in their tradition, to recognize and claim 
what is meaningful in Christianity, and by increasing awareness of how Christians allow 
other viewpoints to define us.  (An irony appears here.  The postliberal belief in the 
incommensurability of worldviews arises in tandem with a fear of Christianity’s 
corruption by secularism, yet postliberals fail to recognize the implausibility or 
impossibility of such contamination to the extent of the truth of incommensurability.)  
Though in considerable tension with belief in incommensurability, postliberalism does 
provide hope for the evangelistic efficacy of a community whose authority lies in the 
attractiveness of its praxis.  (By contrast evangelistic hope for Catholic postliberals rests 
on the prospect that people in want of a moral and religious authority will return to the 
Church.) 
 Having provided Christianity intellectual sanction through the postmodern notion 
of culture or worldview as self-authenticating context of meaning, conservative 
postmodern theology then refuses to play by the logic of the notion, by the rules of the 
postmodern game.  Christianity escapes the application of the relativity and contextuality 
at the heart of this postmodern idea.  On what basis?   On an absolutistic assumption in 
the modern or pre-modern spirit:  that religious truth entails that God intentionally and 
infallibly (though acting through cultural-linguistic realities) constitutes a religion as the 
religion.  At most one religion correctly claims to know an extra-cultural-linguistic and 
ultimate reality.  Publicly speaking, in the short term we cannot adjudicate these 
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competing claims of religious traditions, in keeping with the postliberal immanentist 
assumption.  In the long term, the one true religion established by God will survive, while 
other worldviews may not.  Postliberals recognize that Christianity appears as relative as 
any other religion to outsiders.  But privately speaking, the Christian can know this God-
given absolute connection.  Clearly this theology will not settle for Christianity as one 
context of meaning among many—it must be the absolute religion, the one grand 
exception.  In the tradition of Barth (whether or not Barth is cited), though this theology 
acknowledges the relativity of everything human on one level, ultimately God overrides 
human epistemological finitude. 
 Given the strong Polanyian influence on this project, I will address the thought of 
Esther Meek, who has authored an excellent book on Polanyi’s epistemology.  
Postliberals and the Radical Orthodox do not assume the violation or superceding of 
natural processes in the unique authority of the Bible. By contrast Meek in evangelical 
tradition does hold to supernatural interventionism to guarantee the historicity of the 
biblical witness. On several interconnected fronts I find Meek’s stance on revelation and 
biblical authority problematic from a Polanyian perspective.  Historical biblical criticism 
constitutes a well-established tradition supported by general evidence that pre-modern 
people judge truthfulness by mytho-poetic, theological, and existential rather than 
modern historical standards as well as particular evidence that many biblical narratives 
are in fact not historical.  In the face of such direct challenge one cannot retreat to an 
uncritical haven.  The cruciality of science for Polanyi compounds the difficulties 
inherent in Meek’s position, and not only in the breaking or supercession of scientific 
laws that grounds her view of religious authority.  While an intuitive, unspecifiable, and 
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tacit dimension underlies all science, scientific knowledge often defies common sense or 
naïve realism.  Likewise we need to recognize an unscientific naivete of ancient 
“common sense” concerning the “historical” (see PK, 267).  In the tradition of liberal 
Protestantism (and Judaism) we need to distinguish between theological/ethical and 
historical truth, as Polanyi himself suggested by endorsing “modern theology(’s)” 
acceptance of historical biblical criticism “as its guide for reinterpreting and 
consolidating the Christian faith in a truer form.” (PK, 282-83).  Only then can we do 
justice to the “universal intent” of faithful scientific and historical investigation. 
 While radical postmodernism images humanity and divinity consistently—total 
immanence prevails, conservative postmodernism downplays human transcendence and 
freedom, while stressing them with respect to God.  God chooses to reveal God’s self 
within one particular tradition.  Personal particularity wins out over a wider, more 
consistently immanent revelation—a revelation consonant with both human and divine 
universal intent and with indeterminate future manifestations.17
C. The Moderates 
 
 Not being aware of a representative movement or figure that has spelled out the 
relevant characteristics of moderate postmodernism, I now presume to write 
constructively from that perspective.  The moderate wing takes to heart the postmodern 
freedom from the modern burden of explicating and justifying all basic assumptions and 
all meanings.  It enjoys the postmodern assurance that Christianity has meaning for those 
incarnated and enculturated in it.  This assurance frees it to use critical reason 
appropriately to address problems and opportunities that arise.  It alone of the three 
postmodern camps can be genuinely hopeful.  Part of its relative optimism stems from it 
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alone fully disowning absolutism.  It avoids the deconstructive emphasis on the extreme 
tenuousness or absence of meaning relative to a hidden standard of absolute truth.  It also 
averts postliberalism’s impossible burden of maintaining or proving to the Christian 
community its religion’s absoluteness. 
 I have delineated how both the radicals and the conservatives bounce back and 
forth between immanentist relativism and respective absolutisms.  Moderate 
postmodernism attempts to chart a course between relativism and absolutism.  For it, the 
absence of an absolute beginning and end does not entail deconstruction’s “erring” or 
“aimlessness.”  Rather, humans and animals in their bodily becoming in the world 
normally find purpose and direction in a multiplicity of goals and meanings, some more 
immediate or short-term, some long-term or overarching, some more definite or 
particular, some more provisional or general.  Despite foreclosure from any absolute 
perspective, creatures normally come to perceptual, kinesthetic, and cognitive closure, 
contrary to deconstructive “undecidability.” 
 To the extent poststructuralists would acknowledge the above description of 
normal experience, they might still contend that upon radical reflection (in the modern 
spirit, I would add) ironic skepticism is a more appropriate attitude.  But moderates 
realize that lack of meaning and skepticism are parasitical upon meaning, upon standing 
somewhere.  In normal experience we realize we are in touch with some truth and value, 
even though upon reflection or further experience we discover that we erred in some 
(perhaps crucial) respect or missed the greatest possible value (and, indeed, perhaps 
caused horrible evil in the process). 
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 Crucially moderates realize and claim that we know reality, a reality partly but not 
wholly constituted by us.  There is always a givenness not constructed by any individual 
or cultural group.  Except in the case of other experients (and unless one accepts a 
panpsychic viewpoint without remainder, which I earlier rejected as an expression of 
modern idealism), the given element is not itself already fully constituted or definite, not 
a “world” apart from our participation, but open to our fuller definition.  From a 
postmodern perspective, it is neither necessary nor plausible to postulate either a 
concrete, complete physical realm or a reified moral order completely independent of a 
world evolving and under construction.  But neither is the given simply indefinite or 
amorphous.  Certainly no one can directly or concretely describe the given, for any 
description involves our constituting activity.  Here we can helpfully contrast the 
moderate postmodern vision with other options.  While radical postmodernism denies any 
world beyond our constituting activity and Kantian modernism postulates a fully 
constituted world independent of, but partially accessible through, our constituting 
activity, moderate postmodernism sees given elements and our constituting activity as 
together forming the world. 
 Because of the uncompromising commitment that we are embodied in reality, con 
both radicals and postliberals, moderates reject any strong doctrine of 
incommensurability and credit others with some grasp of truth.  Even radically divergent 
perspectives may at some level apprehend the same given element of reality.  Moderate 
postmodernism holds that error is corrigible—not by some absolutely privileged, 
infallible, inherently different method, but by our normal ways of coming to know in the 
world; that there are better and worse; that in moving from one perspective to another, we 
 29 
not only achieve something aesthetically novel (as in Lyotard’s “paralogy”), but can 
stretch to fuller truth.  In short, moderate postmodernism places us in the muck and mire 
of real existence with all its ambiguity, where none of us has any absolute possession of 
the truth but none of us is totally blind either, where we may be “often perplexed, but not 
defeated,” where we can and should reach for fuller truth and greater value. 
 With the radicals, moderates recognize that part of Christianity’s largest context 
of meaning involves its interconnections with differing worldviews.  While maintaining 
Christianity’s relative identity, it eschews the notion of Christianity’s absolute difference 
from other religions and worldviews.  It willingly and hopefully enters into dialogue with 
the other.  While acknowledging that a Western Christian cannot know Buddhism, for 
example, precisely as someone enculturated in Buddhism from birth, it believes that 
mutual translation and understanding are possible.  It shares its viewpoints and 
commitments in the faith that they (and those of the partner in dialogue) can have 
relevance to more than an isolated context, can have more universal meaning.  Change 
and even conversion are possible outcomes of dialogue. Such faith involves the basic 
assumption that continuous with our rootedness in a particular culture and tradition is our 
rootedness in the being/becoming of the world.  
 The moderate branch recognizes our immanence in contexts of meaning in a way 
that modernity did not and disavows its assumption or standard of absolute 
transcendence.  But unlike the other two branches, it does allow a significant place for 
freedom and transcendence, as the preceding analysis suggests. Humans have the 
potential and sometimes the obligation to critique smaller and larger contexts of meaning 
and to embrace or reject them, the potential to change our judgments regarding truth and 
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our moral commitments.  The middle branch alone consistently gives the critical side of 
the postmodern spirit its due.  
 As does radical postmodernism, the moderates image humanity and divinity 
harmoniously.  As some balance of transcendence and immanence pertains to humans, so 
too to God.  A stronger sense of divine immanence prevails than in classical theology, 
even as greater immanence characterizes its portrait of humanity. To the extent they 
address directly concepts or metaphors for God, postmodern moderates may favor 
panentheism, as do Protestants Sally McFague and Peter Hodgson and Catholic David 
Tracy.  
 
     VI. Epilogue 
 A sense of rootlessness and of the arbitrariness of ways of life has grown in 
Western civilization over the past century or more.  This rootlessness and disembodiment 
derives in part from the controlling picture of modernity, a picture that denies our roots. 
Modernity initially hoped that critical reason would banish the arbitrariness of individual 
and institutional beliefs and practices.  As reason failed to establish absolute truth, hopes 
for overcoming arbitrariness increasingly banked on the prereflective; however, this hope 
was dashed as well.  The past century also saw an increasing awareness of alternative 
cultures and worldviews.   
 While preliminarily acknowledging bodily and social rootedness, radical 
postmodernists, like some existentialist forerunners, applaud rootlessness and 
arbitrariness-relativism.  The desire to feel “at home” in the world, for things to “hang 
together,” is finally inappropriate and unhealthy.  Postliberals by contrast attempt to 
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purchase at-home-ness by positing an absolute grounding in a tradition.  Given an 
increasing sense of uprootedness in modern and postmodern worlds, it should not 
surprise us that both radical celebration and postliberal exorcism of rootlessness and 
arbitrariness have appeal.   
 Refusing either extreme, moderate postmodernism acknowledges both our 
rootedness in meaning—through our bodies and traditions I would claim—and the 
element of arbitrariness in all ours ways of viewing and doing.  Nothing is absolute or 
necessary in a logical sense, yet this does not preclude meaning and coherence.  Our 
rootedness in our bodies and world is not one of stasis, but of openness both to new 
constitutions of the world and to fuller apprehensions of the world’s givenness. 
 The postmodern insight that everyone must stand somewhere can be startling.  
Radical and conservative postmodernism see everyone as standing irreconcilably far 
apart.  The radicals, though, attempt to overcome such incommensurability by the 
standing everywhere-nowhere of endorsing equally every position.  Moderate 
postmodernism recognizes our differences, but affirms that through our embodiment in 
the world we do not stand irreducibly far apart. 
 The abandonment of the modern assumption of and search for the privileged 
position of absolute self-possession, absolute transcendence with respect to time, and 
absolute clarity and certainty, will sadden some.  But perhaps renouncing any absolute 
human perspective should not be that unsettling.  Those who disbelieve in God 
presumably have no reason to expect any absolute perspective.  Those who believe in 
God might well confess that there is only one absolute perspective, and that it belongs to 
God.  
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     ENDNOTES 
1‘Postmodern’ has gained supremacy over the alternative terms ‘postcritical’ and ‘postliberal’.  Michael 
Polanyi’s ‘postcritical’ stands as probably the best single word for conveying the substance of the shift 
from modernity as I construe it in this essay.  The term, as I understand it, does not suggest the 
impossibility or undesirability of appropriate critical reflection, but rather modernity’s failure to recognize 
the limits of critical reasoning.  ‘Postliberal’ does connect with ‘postcritical’ insofar as one of those limits 
is the impossibility of (and the wrong-headedness of attempting) totally to transcend tradition.  However, 
one cannot answer the question of how far one can or should transcend tradition in a particular cultural or 
religious context with generalities.  It should not surprise us then that ‘postliberal’ is the term of choice for 
those with a conservative orientation. 
 
2 I am indebted to my mentor in postmodernity, William H. Poteat, for the concept of the controlling 
“picture,” as well as for the idea, developed later in this essay, that idealism and empiricism represent flip 
sides of the same dualistic coin.  (Poteat in turn was influenced by French phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty on this latter idea.) 
 
3 In this essay I use the term “critical reason” in a general sense, meaning reason as it questions and/or 
attempts to establish or justify or make explicit meaning and value. 
 
4 Martin Luther, taking a much more critical stance toward Scripture than subsequent Protestant scholastics, 
foreshadowed critical activities of the Enlightenment by denying the historical accuracy of parts of the 
Bible and by judging as theologically invalid certain biblical books (Van A. Harvey). 
 
5 Though certainly both positive and negative practical and social consequences have issued as well.  For 
example, on the positive side:  1) many accomplishments of science, medicine, and technology 2) the 
overthrowing of many superstitions 3) a sense of universal human rights; on the negative side:  1) the 
exploitation of nature and ecological crisis 2) the common practice by physicians of treating patents as just 
physical organisms (a practice that many medical schools now discourage in something of a postmodern 
trend).  Given my contention that postmodernity corrects excesses of modernity and is impelled by a more 
truthful controlling assumption, a reader might get the impression that I regard modernity as “bad” and 
postmodernity as “good.”  As my preceding remarks suggest, such simplism does not represent my overall 
position. 
 
6While Kant came to deny that we can know any “thing in itself,” as he grappled with the implications of 
modernity’s subject-object split, what is noteworthy is his very assumption of a fully determinate object in 
itself, albeit unknowable, behind any perception.  
 
7 Note that my wording entails that, in knowing, something is there---something “stands against” us.  
Postmodernity’s logic does not permit the subjectivistic and solipsistic tendencies of modernity.  We, 
individually or collectively, only partly create the world we know.  The correspondence theory of truth is 
not altogether wrong. 
 
8 Polanyi’s term “postcritical,” consonant with what I am calling “the postmodern spirit,” takes in both the 
critical and the acritical or precritical.  Polanyi assented to—critically—“the greatly increased powers of 
man,” granting us a “capacity for self-transcendence of which we can never again divest ourselves.”  (PK, 
268). 
 
9 It is no coincidence that David Ray Griffin typically identifies modernity and its negativities with its 
materialistic and sensationalistic side, while largely overlooking its idealist side. 
 
10 For a related evaluation, see David E. Klemm. 
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11 Though radical pragmatism-historicism has affinities with poststructuralism, it has not been as influential 
among theologians. 
 
12 Though it may well be that deconstruction’s reliance on reflective and linguistic metaphors for reality—
such as, “writing,” “text,” “interpretation”—hinders it from acknowledging our (more) prereflective and 
bodily grounding in meaning. 
 
13 By “meaning,” I connote both sense and value. 
 
14 I believe Sallie McFague granted deconstruction too much in Models of God, in writing that “absence is 
at least more prevalent than presence” (25).  This conflicts, or at least is in tension, with her assumption 
that Christian faith is “most basically a claim that the universe is neither indifferent nor malevolent but that 
there is a power (and a personal power at that) which is on the side of life and its fulfillment” (x). 
 
15 By “absolute,” I do not mean to suggest that God is unrelated to or unaffected by creation. 
 
16 Charles W. Allen describes tribalism’s threat-irrelevancy polarity in “The Primacy of Phronesis.” 
 
17 See Dale Cannon, David W. Rutledge, and Esther L. Meek, Tradition and Discovery 31/3, for additional 
discussion of Meek’s theology relative to Polanyi’s post-critical philosophy 
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